

## Community resources

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*courage is contagious*

## Viewing cable 09ISLAMABAD586, SAVING THE F-16 PROGRAM

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the [structure of a cable](#) as well as how to [discuss them](#) with others. See also the [FAQs](#)

### Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

### Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags [#cablegate](#) and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. [#09ISLAMABAD586](#).

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
<a href="#">09ISLAMABAD586</a>	2009-03-18 16:27	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Islamabad

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.thehindu.com/news/article2059881.ece?homepage=true>

VZCZCXRO3014  
OO RUEHLH RUEHPW  
DE RUEHIL #0586/01 0771627  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
O 181627Z MAR 09  
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1940  
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0033  
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 9923  
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 4660  
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 1306  
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 6969  
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 5896  
RHMFSS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY  
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 000586

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2018  
TAGS: [PREL](#) [PTER](#) [PGOV](#) [MARR](#) [MOPS](#) [PK](#)  
SUBJECT: SAVING THE F-16 PROGRAM

REF: ISLAMABAD 177 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)

1. (C) Summary. Pakistan is the most important front-line state in our battle against extremists who threaten the U.S. and our allies. In  
2. (C) Although the economy is stabilizing, we do not believe the GOP has or will find the \$2 billion plus required to complete the entire F  
3. (C) While we understand New Delhi's opposition to the program, the reality is that this program will not degrade India's overwhelming air  
4. (C) The Pressler Amendment sanctions that prevented the Clinton Administration from delivering 28 Peacegate F-16 aircraft that Pakistan p  
5. (C) What is broadly referred to as the "F-16 case" is really three individual cases: (1) a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program purchase  
Overcoming the Trust Deficit

16. (C) The F-16 package is the flagship symbol of renewed post 9/11 engagement with the Pakistani military. It is difficult to over-emphasize  
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deliver the aircraft that Pakistan had paid for, but demanded that Pakistan pay demurrage charges for storing them; finally, in 1998, the USG  
17. (C) Increasing trust with the military is the basis for the security pillar of our counter-insurgency strategy, i.e., expanding Frontier  
Enhancing Pakistani COIN Capability

18. (C) Our goal is to enable Pakistan to fight the militants using Pakistani safe havens so that we will not have to deploy U.S. troops to c  
19. (C) If our goal is to press the Army to change strategy and redeploy forces from the Indian border, punishing the Air Force by canceling  
Maintaining Cargo Operations

10. (C) Approximately 30 percent of the fuel and 70 percent of the dry cargo required to support U.S. troops in Afghanistan transits Pakista  
Regional Stability

11. (C) To overcome overwhelming Indian military superiority, Pakistan developed both its nuclear/missile program and its air power. F-16 a  
12. (C) India enjoys an almost 2-1 advantage (736 to 370) over Pakistan in advanced multi-purpose fighters. Pakistan's shortfalls in traini  
ISLAMABAD 00000586 003 OF 003

significant new technologies and further expand its air superiority over Pakistan.

13. (C) The sale of new aircraft and 500 AMRAAM missiles would give Pakistan beyond visual range capability, but Pakistan will acquire the a  
14. (C) We do deny Pakistan requests for arms sales that could upset the regional balance of power. Post on February 20 recommended that We  
Building Civilian Control of the Military

15. (C) Pakistan's civilian leaders want increased economic assistance, but they need to demonstrate to the military the benefits of support  
16. (C) Officially suggesting that the Pakistanis use Coalition Support Funds (CSF) would, post believes, create issues over congressional i

Bottom Line

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17. (C) Post agrees with State that it is unlikely we will/should convince Congress to use FMF to pick up the tab for the entire F-16 progra

PATTERSON